The Regional Inspector General/Manila conducted this audit to determine whether the program is achieving its main goals of improving the capacity of FATA governmental institutions to govern and increasing the capacity of FATA NGOs to promote good governance (page 6). Although the program has provided training, taken initial steps to automate FATA institutions, and completed some media activities, little has yet been achieved in building the capacity of FATA governmental institutions and NGOs. As of October 31, 2009, the capacity building program had been in place for 22 months of a 36-month program but had achieved little with regard to the program’s two main goals. Additional time may be needed, as many planned activities are scheduled to be completed over 3 years, and most capacity building activities began after October 2008—10 months into the 3-year performance period.

Regarding the first main goal, the program has not yet achieved the goal of improving the capacity of FATA governmental institutions to govern. The audit found that little progress had been achieved to build the capacity of the FATA Secretariat and the FATA Development Authority, in part because the program got off to such a slow start. During the first year, the contractor focused its resources on working out best approaches to designing and implementing activities, building up relationships with FATA institutions, and developing work plans. Also, the deteriorating security situation in Peshawar and the assassination in November 2008 of the chief of party of another USAID program delayed progress in the FATA capacity building program. However, some progress has been made in certain activities. For example, in its second year the program focused on training in project management, development planning, and financial management. As of September 30, 2009, 74 training events had been completed for 1,224 FATA governmental institution staff members (page 7).

Regarding the second main goal, the program did not increase the capacity of these NGOs to promote good governance, although some progress was made. For example, the program had implemented a few activities to address weaknesses of FATA NGOs, such as providing formal training classes and purchasing office equipment for 42 NGOs working in FATA. However, the few FATA-based NGOs that exist lack the human and financial resources to promote good governance effectively. In most instances, FATA NGOs needed first to strengthen their proposal preparation skills, financial management practices, and monitoring and evaluation capabilities before they could start to promote good governance (page 8).

Because of a high-level change of emphasis in U.S. Government strategy toward greater involvement of Pakistani organizations in implementing assistance programs, the mission began to rethink its strategy of providing the bulk of its program assistance through U.S.-based implementers such as DAI. As a result, in June 2009 the mission refrained from fully funding a DAI incremental funding request of $15.3 million and, 4 months later, approved only $4.7 million in additional funds. In October 2009, the mission asked DAI to consider preparing a 90-day demobilization plan. However, as of November 2009, no final decision had been made as to whether the DAI contract would be terminated or, if terminated, what program implementation mechanisms would replace the U.S.-based contractor (page 5).
In summary, although little real progress had been made to date to build capacity of either FATA governmental entities or FATA NGOs, the audit discusses three areas in which program accomplishments have been delayed and improvements can be made:

* The transition to a new implementation strategy has impeded the program’s progress (page 9).
* Capacity building in automation has had little success, and most of the computer hardware purchased for the program has remained boxed up and unused (page 11).
* Monitoring and reporting systems for managing development projects—such as a geographic information system that enables project information to be represented on maps and a database system to document the life cycle of development projects— have not been completed, and they may not be completed until June 2010 (page 16).

This report contains four recommendations to address these issues and to help improve implementation of the program (pages 11, 15, and 18). We recommend that USAID/Pakistan:

* Provide immediate written guidance to the contractor and to the FATA governmental institutions to identify contractual arrangements that would be in force to implement the Capacity Building for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Program as the mission transitions to USAID’s new implementation strategy.
* Develop and issue implementation plans, following best practices, to (1) assign 260 computers (and related equipment) to the FATA governmental institutions and (2) transfer 140 laptop computers to the North-West Frontier Province and to ensure that the computer equipment will be used for intended purposes and that maximum benefits will be derived from this equipment.
* Take immediate steps to confirm the existence of 72 laptop computers. If the laptop computers cannot be produced, the mission should issue a bill of collection to the contractor for $1,400 for each missing laptop.
* Require the contractor to develop and put into use detailed implementation plans for both the geographic information system and the planning commission database under development for use by the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Secretariat. The plans should identify roles and responsibilities to be carried out by the contractor and others and should contain best practices of systems development, such as obtaining approval by stakeholders, establishing target dates for completing user manuals, training users and administrators, and preparing for the final handover of day-to-day operations and maintenance to the Secretariat.

On the basis of an evaluation of the mission’s response to the draft report, the Office of Inspector General determined that final action has been taken on recommendation 1, and management decisions have been reached on recommendations 2, 3, and 4. The mission’s written comments on the draft report are included in their entirety, without attachments, as appendix II to this report (see page 22).

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WASHINGTON — One of the problems with the U.S.-Pakistan relationship over the decades has been that the two sides tend to fall in and out of love like a tempestuous couple, rather than maintain a steady and dependable bond. So it’s wise to approach recent talk about a new strategic breakthrough with some caution and skepticism.

In the upbeat White House version, the first big success for the Obama administration’s new Afghanistan policy has come not in the battle of Marja in Helmand province but in Islamabad. Officials cite Pakistan’s cooperation with the CIA in capturing and interrogating top leaders of the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan’s new dialogue with India.

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Pakistani officials agree that there has been a positive change in mood. They say the Obama administration has taken quiet steps to reassure Islamabad that the U.S. doesn’t want to grab Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and that it isn’t trying to smuggle in covert operators disguised as U.S. contractors. “It’s about getting back to trusting each other,” says one Pakistani official.

But military and intelligence officials on both sides appear wary of overpromising what this new partnership can deliver. There’s greater confidence, they say, because officials know each other better. One U.S. official counts 25 high-level American visits to Pakistan since President Obama took office. Even so, “there is a fair amount of residual mistrust,” warns Shuja Nawaz of the Atlantic Council, a nonpartisan think tank.

One key administration official characterizes the relationship this way: “We have narrowed the gap in terms of strategic outlooks, and that has allowed a greater cooperation on the tactical level.” But he cautions that it would overstate this rapprochement to call it a “strategic recalibration,” as some White House officials have.

The up-and-down history of the relationship was examined by CIA analysts in a recent report. They noted that this ebb-and-flow was driven in part by the personalities on both sides, but that the Pakistanis always retained a focus on their strategic interests — starting with their historical rivalry with India.

Given the centrality of India in Pakistan’s security calculus, U.S. officials are encouraged by the resumption last month of high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan. The Obama administration has been working behind the scenes to foster these contacts and to reassure both sides.

The X-factor in the Indo-Pak contacts is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has been a strong advocate of better relations with his neighbor. U.S. officials have advised Pakistan that, in their view, Singh is an unusually farsighted leader who may be able to open doors in New Delhi that have otherwise been closed.

Indians, for their part, insist that no real progress in the relationship will be possible unless the Pakistani intelligence service curbs the Kashmiri militant groups, such as Lashkar-i-Taiba, that it helped create. “We get it,” says one Pakistani. But little has happened yet on the ground that would reassure India.

To address Pakistani security anxieties, the Obama administration has taken several little-noticed steps. One is to implicitly accept Pakistan’s status as a declared nuclear weapons state and thereby counter conspiracy theories that the U.S. is secretly plotting to seize Pakistani nukes.

Obama made an early move in that direction when he told Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper last June, “I have confidence that the Pakistani government has safeguarded its nuclear arsenal. It’s Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.” There have been similar private assurances, officials say.

The U.S. is also trying to combat Pakistani fears about covert U.S. military or intelligence activities. Pakistani Ambassador Husain Haqqani has been negotiating measures for greater transparency, such as clearer labeling of official cargo. And the administration has repeated Obama’s assurance last June that “we have no intention of sending U.S. troops into Pakistan.”

The trickiest issue remains Afghanistan. The Pakistanis provided important help last month by capturing Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (which was partly an accident, given that neither the U.S. nor Pakistan knew at first that this was the No. 2 Taliban official). Because Baradar was the Taliban’s chief of logistics and had notebooks and computer records, the operation proved to be a “gold mine,” says one official.

But there’s always something new to worry about in this relationship. The Pakistanis are concerned of late that the U.S. may negotiate a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban that cuts them out as an intermediary. “In reconciliation talks, Pakistan must have a seat at the table,” insists one Pakistani. We should all be so lucky, if this proves the biggest problem.

By David Ignatius davidignatius@washpost.com

Source: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/03/04/to_pakistan_almost_with_love_104646.html

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THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT
The 2009 CPR annual report is available now, which covers activities implemented between July 2009 to December 2009 and also includes strategic goals and agenda for 2010. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT.